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The Consumer Rights Act 2015 – A bastion of European consumer rights?  
Abstract: 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 seeks to consolidate in one place key consumer rights covering 
contracts for goods, services, and digital content and the law relating to unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.  These are areas where there has been considerable activity at both a national and EU level.  
In particular, the Consumer Sales Directive 99/44/EC, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Directive 93/13/EEC and the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU have all made significant 
changes to Member State law, promoting the idea of the  ‘informed consumer’ able to assert his or her 
rights in entering consumer contracts.  This article will examine the extent to which the Act promotes 
the objectives of these Directives and the implications of the result of the June 2016 referendum that 
the UK should leave the EU.  Does the Consumer Rights Act 2015 represent a valuable consolidation 
of EU and UK consumer policy?  Are EU rights being absorbed into a distinctive national framework 
of consumer rights?   
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 – A bastion of European consumer rights? 
Professor Paula Giliker (University of Bristol)* 
 
 ‘For too long consumers and businesses have struggled to understand the complicated rules that apply when 
buying goods and services ... That is why the Consumer Rights Act is so important in setting out clear and 
updated consumer rights for goods, services and, for the first time, digital content ... Well-informed, confident 
consumers are vital for driving continued growth and building a stronger economy.’1  
  
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 came into force on 1 October 2015.2  It has been described 
by consumer organisation Which? as ‘the biggest shake up in consumer rights law in a 
generation’.3  Its aims are ambitious: to simplify, strengthen and modernise UK consumer 
law, consolidating in one place fundamental consumer rights covering contracts for goods, 
services, digital content and the law relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts.4  These 
goals are impressive and respond to genuine consumer needs.  UK consumer law, prior to the 
Act, was unnecessarily complex, fragmented and, in places, unclear, for example where the 
                                                          
* The author would like to thank Lucinda Miller, Albert Sanchez Graells, Keith Stanton, Keith Syrett and the two 
anonymous Legal Studies reviewers for their helpful suggestions in the preparation of this paper. Any errors 
remain those of the author alone. 
1 Jo Swinson (then Consumer Minister), Press Release 27 March 2015, ‘Biggest overhaul of Consumer Rights in 
a Generation’.  
2 This date applies to the main provisions of the Act, although some provisions were introduced at an earlier 
date.  The Act applies to the United Kingdom (consumer rights are a reserved matter and not devolved to 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland).  See, generally, A Samuels, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015’ [2015] JBL 
159. 
3 http://www.which.co.uk/consumer-rights/regulation/consumer-rights-act, accessed 24/8/2016. 
4 The Act further introduces easier routes for consumers and small and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) to 
challenge anti-competitive behaviour through the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’).  These measures will 
not be dealt with in this article, although it should be noted that UK competition law is now heavily influenced 
by EU law: see A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th ed., Oxford: OUP 
2016) Ch 13; R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (8th ed., Oxford: OUP 2015) pp 77ff.  See, in particular, 
Council Regulation 1/2003. 
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law had not kept up with technological change, lacked precision or was couched in legalistic 
language.5  A key reason for this complexity has been the introduction into UK law over the 
past 30 years of new consumer rights deriving from European directives.6  Such measures 
have, in the main, been transposed into UK law using the ‘copy out’ approach, by which the 
draftsman, whenever possible, reproduces the wording of the directive usually within 
secondary legislation or (more rarely) by amending existing statutory provisions.7  Examples 
of the difficulties which arise in integrating these new provisions into UK law may be found 
in relation to the Consumer Sales Directive 99/44/EC (CSD)8 and the Unfair Terms Directive 
93/13/EEC (UTD)9.  These important directives introduced changes to the sale of goods, 
supply of services and general contracting regime, but their transposition into UK law proved 
to be less than smooth.10  Miller describes the transposition of the CSD as bringing into UK 
law ‘a tortuous web of legal provisions, impenetrable to those unversed in the particular area 
of sales law’, leaving UK law ‘a disjointed, often incoherent, amalgam of 20th century 
consumer protection provisions grafted onto commercially rooted, and orientated rules.’11  In 
particular, the decision to introduce a range of new consumer-friendly remedies in addition to 
those already existing in UK law left the consumer facing a confusing overlap of remedies.12  
This situation was further aggravated by the fact that the CSD is a minimum harmonisation 
directive, that is, it permits Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent protective 
measures if consistent with Treaty provisions.13  While this ensures a minimum standard of 
protection across EU States, it inevitably leads to fragmentation, giving rise to diversity 
                                                          
5 As acknowledged by the Government in its Explanatory Notes to the Act, [5]. 
6 See H Schulte-Nölke, C Twigg-Flesner and M Ebers (eds), EC Consumer Law Compendium (Munich: Sellier, 
2008). Under Article 288(3) TFEU, the Member State has an obligation to transpose EU directives into the 
national legal system, although the choice of form and method of transposition is left to the national authorities.   
7 See UK Government’s Guiding Principles for EU Legislation, 5(c). 
8 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees OJ L 171, 07/07/1999 pp 12-16. 
9 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts OJ L 095, 21/04/1993 pp 
29-34. 
10 See, for example, C Twigg-Flesner and R Bradgate, ‘The EC Directive On Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees - All Talk and No Do?’  Web JCLI 2000(2) 
(http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2000/issue2/flesner2.html, accessed 24/8/2016). 
11 L Miller, ‘After the Unfair Contract Terms Directive: Recent European Directives and English law’ (2007) 1 
ERCL 88, 91. 
12 See Part 5A, Sale of Goods Act 1979 and similar provisions under Part 1B of the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982.  See  C Willett, M Morgan-Taylor and A Naidoo, ‘The Sale and Supply of Goods to 
Consumers Regulations’ [2004] JBL 94. 
13 Notably Art. 34 TFEU.  See Art 8(2), Consumer Sales Directive and, generally, S Prechal, Directives in EC 
Law (2nd rev ed, Oxford: OUP, 2005) Ch 5. 
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between the national laws of Member States,14 and complexity at a local level where EU law 
is introduced alongside existing national provisions without any attempt to integrate the 
provisions into national law.   
 
The transposition of the CSD received criticism from the Davidson Review in 2006,15 which 
examined the introduction of European directives into domestic law and concluded that UK 
law on the sale of goods was unnecessarily complex.16  Further criticisms have been raised in 
relation to the overlapping regimes dealing with unfair terms.  Here again existing legislation 
(the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977) was merely supplemented by a set of Regulations 
implementing the 1993 Unfair Terms Directive (again a minimum harmonisation directive).17  
The Law Commissions in their report of February 2005 recommended that a unified regime 
was needed to reduce uncertainty and confusion in this area for the benefit of consumers, 
businesses and enforcement authorities alike.18   
 
In introducing the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the UK Government expressly acknowledged 
the difficulties which had arisen in implementing the Consumer Sales Directive 99/44/EC and 
the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC alongside pre-existing UK legislation.19  The Act thus 
replaces earlier legislation which had implemented these EU Directives, responding to the 
concerns raised above.20  It does not, perhaps surprisingly, implement the Consumer Rights 
                                                          
14 The Report of the European Commission on the implementation of the CSD, for example, found ‘significant 
diversity between national laws as a result of the use of the minimum clause and the various regulatory options 
provided by the Directive’: Commission Communication on the implementation of Directive 1999/44, COM 
(2007) 210, 24 April 2007, [12].   
15 Davidson Review (HM Treasury: November 2006).  See also G Howells and C Twigg-Flesner, ‘Consolidation 
and simplification of UK consumer law’ (BIS, 2010).  BIS consulted from July to October 2012 on proposals to 
clarify consumer rights in goods, services and digital content: Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying 
Consumer Law (BIS, 2012). 
16 See also Law Commission Report No 317/ Scottish Law Commission No.216, Consumer Remedies for Faulty 
Goods (November 2009). 
17 Art 8, Unfair Terms Directive. 
18 Law Commission Report No 292/Scottish Law Commission Report No 199, Unfair Terms in Contracts 
(2005).  
19 Explanatory Notes to Act, [5]-[18]. 
20 In addition, the Act implements some provisions (in respect of enforcement) of: Regulation (EC) No. 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws;  Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to 
the marketing of products; Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on general 
product safety; and Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interests. 
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Directive 2011/83/EU,21 despite the unfortunate similarity in title, with the exception of 
certain parts of Articles 5, 6 18, 20 and 23 of the CRD which are implemented in Part 1.22  
The provisions of the CRD – which deal primarily with distance and off-premises contracts – 
may be found in earlier secondary legislation: the Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) 
Regulations 2012,23 and the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 2013.24   Nevertheless the Government expressly stated that: ‘In 
developing proposals for the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Government has taken into 
account the definitions and measures contained within the CRD and, as far as appropriate, has 
made the Act consistent with the CRD, with the intention of achieving overall a simple, 
coherent framework of consumer legislation’.25  
 
This article will focus on Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, preceded by an initial examination of the 
key concepts of ‘trader’ and ‘consumer’ under the Act.  It will examine the extent to which 
these Parts (which introduce new measures concerning consumer contracts for goods, digital 
content and services, and unfair terms) are likely to succeed in realising the Government’s 
stated goal of resolving the inconsistencies and overlaps between domestic and EU law.   It 
will also consider the implications of ‘Brexit’ following the result of the June 2016 
referendum.  Does the 2015 Act present us with a valuable consolidation of EU and UK 
consumer law which will outlast the UK leaving the EU?  To what extent, regardless of 
Brexit, have EU rights been absorbed into a distinctive national framework of consumer 
rights?   
 
1.  Bringing EU law into the fold I: Defining ‘trader’ and ‘consumer’ under section 
2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
One of the policy objectives of the Act is to align, as far as possible, the definitions of certain 
key terms across the Act and other consumer law.  Key definitions are set out in s 2.26  These 
                                                          
21 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC 
and Directive 97/7/EC, OJ L 304/64, 22.11.2011. On the difficulties arising from not including the Consumer 
Rights Directive within this consolidating Act, see P Giliker, ‘The Transposition of the Consumer Rights 
Directive into UK Law: Implementing a Maximum Harmonization Directive’ (2015) 23 ERPL 5.   
22 The Consumer Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2015/1629 amend and revoke earlier legislation which 
had introduced these measures into UK law. 
23  2012/3110. 
24  2013/3134. 
25 Explanatory Notes to the CRA, [13].   
26 See also s.59 CRA (interpretation). 
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include the terms ‘trader’, ‘consumer’, ‘business’, ‘goods’ and ‘digital content’.27 ‘Service’ 
interestingly is not defined – the reason given that it was not defined in the Supply and Sale 
of Good Act 1982.28  These definitions apply to both Parts 1 and 2 of the Act.29 
 
Trader 
Section 2(2) defines ‘trader’ as: a person acting for purposes relating to that person's trade, 
business, craft or profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in 
the trader's name or on the trader's behalf.30  This definition replaces previous terminology, 
including the ‘seller in the course of business’ (Sale of Goods Act 1979) or simply the 
‘business’ (Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s.14) with a composite term ‘trader’.  In opting 
for a definition which reflects that found at Article 2(2) of the Consumer Rights Directive 
2011/83/EU (CRD),31 the drafters of the Act have opted for simplicity but also an approach 
consistent with a maximum harmonisation Directive.  It also reflects the general approach 
found in EU consumer directives – consider, for example, the definition of ‘seller or supplier’ 
found at Article 2(c) of the Unfair Terms Directive - any natural or legal person who, in 
contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or 
profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned – and ‘seller’ at Art 1.2(c) of the 
Consumer Sales Directive - any natural or legal person who, under a contract, sells 
consumer goods in the course of his trade, business or profession.  This point here is one of 
clarity in a statute covering a range of different types of contracts with the added benefit of 
providing some degree of consistency with the EU consumer framework. 
 
Consumer 
In a piece of consumer legislation, the definition of the beneficiary of the rights provided – 
‘the consumer’ – is obviously of vital importance.  However, the 1988 decision of R. & B. 
Customs Brokers Co. Ltd. v. United Dominions Trust Ltd.32 where the Court of Appeal had 
                                                          
27 Note s.2(8) sets out the definition of ‘goods’ which does derive from Article 2(3) of the CRD. The definition 
of digital content in s.2(9) is the same as the definition in the CRD (Art 2(11)). See also s.5 which defines ‘sales 
contracts’, which is consistent with the category of ‘sales contract’ under the CRD. 
28 Explanatory Notes to Act, [34].  Query whether this is an adequate explanation. 
29 See s.76 CRA (Interpretation of Part 2), notably s.76(2). 
30 s.2(7) states that ‘Business’ includes the activities of any government department or local or public authority.   
31 Art. 2(2) CRD: ‘trader’ means any natural person or any legal person, irrespective of whether privately or 
publicly owned, who is acting, including through any other person acting in his name or on his behalf, for 
purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession in relation to contracts covered by this Directive. 
32 [1988] 1 WLR 321.  McKendrick notes, however, that the decision was ‘a surprising one’ and, although 
followed in Feldaroll Foundry plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 747, has been subject to 
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been prepared to accept that a company could be deemed to be dealing as a consumer for the 
sake of s.12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 renders this definition potentially 
controversial.   Would this case survive under the new legislation?  The answer is no.  
Section 2(3) defines ‘consumer’ as: ‘an individual33 acting for purposes that are wholly or 
mainly outside that individual's trade, business, craft or profession.’   This may be compared 
with the Consumer Rights Directive definition (Art. 2(1)): ‘consumer’ means any natural 
person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside 
his trade, business, craft or profession.  Recital 17, CRD adds, however, that in the case of 
dual purpose contracts, where the contract is concluded for purposes partly within and partly 
outside the person’s trade and the trade purpose is so limited as ‘not to be predominant in the 
overall context of the contract’, that person should also be considered as a consumer.  While 
it may be queried whether any material difference exists between ‘wholly or mainly outside’ 
or ‘not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract’, it is clear that both 
definitions are wider than those used in the Consumer Sales Directive34 and the Unfair Terms 
Directive.35  The definition does also reflect the wording adopted by the Regulations 
implementing the CRD, albeit in the context (primarily) of measures relating to off-premises 
and distance contracts.36  
 
The UK government has therefore chosen to rely on a wider definition of consumer than that 
found in the CSD and UTD.  This is permissible in that these are minimum harmonisation 
measures (unlike the CRD).   It will, however, exclude small businesses, such as those found 
in the R & B Custom Brokers case, in that they are not ‘natural’ persons.  Concerns remain, 
however.  It is submitted that despite excluding companies from the consumer definition, the 
dividing line between B2C and B2B contracts will remain a point of contention.  Only 
‘living’ consumers are covered by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and yet it is easy to 
envisage demarcation issues involving, for example, whether a sole trader (a ‘natural’ person) 
who purchases a laptop is acting ‘mainly’ outside her trade or business in relation to this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a considerable degree of criticism: E McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th ed., Oxford: 
OUP, 2014) p 435. 
33 Clarified as a natural person in the Explanatory Notes, [36]. 
34 CSD Art 1.2(a): any natural person who, in the contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes 
which are not related to his trade, business or profession. 
35 UTD Art 2(b): any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade, business or profession.  Consider, however, the recent case of Case C-110/14 Costea v SC 
Volksbank România SA ECLI:EU:C:2015:538 (3 September 2015). 
36 See Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013/3134, Reg 4 
and The Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012/3110 Reg 2. 
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particular purchase.  This suggests that this definition is far from watertight in guaranteeing 
clarity.  It also signifies that we remain far from any commonly agreed European definition of 
consumer.  Divergence as to this key definition will continue to exist across Member States. 
 
In introducing common definitions for both sales and unfair terms law, the aim of the 
government is to render these areas of law more coherent.  Riefa argues that this paves the 
way for consumer law to be further consolidated, while evolving in a more orderly fashion.37  
It remains to be seen if this optimistic view is correct. 
 
 
2. Bringing EU law into the fold II: The Consumer Sales Directive 99/44/EC 
Part 1 of the Act deals with agreements between a trader and a consumer for the trader to 
supply goods, digital content or services, if the agreement is a contract.38  It replaces earlier 
legislation which had implemented the Consumer Sales Directive (CSD), namely the Sale 
and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002, which are now revoked.39  As 
indicated above, the Regulations had inserted the provisions of the Directive into existing 
legislation, such as the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, 
without making any real attempt to reconcile them with pre-existing statutory provisions.  
This led to confusion and disjuncture and this is what the Consumer Rights Act seeks to 
rectify.  For business to consumer contracts, therefore, the CRA provides a statutory 
framework for contracts relating to goods, services and digital content.40  The 1979 and 1982 
Acts will still apply to business to business (B2B) and consumer to consumer (C2C) 
contracts. On paper, therefore, this should render the law easier to understand and provides a 
valuable opportunity to integrate fully EU legislation on B2C contracts into UK law.  This 
section will examine the extent to which these goals have been achieved. 
 
(a) The aims of Part 1 of the Act   
Part 1 of the Act deals with a number of matters relating to goods, services and digital 
content.  In terms of goods, it sets out the standards that goods must meet and consolidates 
                                                          
37 C Riefa, ‘Codification: The Future of English Consumer Law?’ (2015) 4 EuCML 12, 20.  She acknowledges, 
however, that while the Act consolidates sales and unfair terms law, other key areas of consumer protection 
remain outside this instrument. 
38 s1(1), CRA. 
39 SI 2002/3045.  See Schedule 1, para 53, CRA.  
40 Certain provisions of Sale of Goods Act 1979 will still apply, however, e.g. rules which are applicable to all 
contracts of sale of goods, and those regarding matters such as when property in goods passes. 
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and aligns the previously inconsistent remedies available to consumers for goods supplied 
under different contract types, such as sale, work and materials, conditional sale and hire 
purchase.  It also establishes a time period of 30 days in which consumers can reject 
substandard goods and be entitled to a full refund and limits the number of repairs or 
replacements of substandard goods before traders must offer some money back.  Limits are 
also placed on the extent to which traders may reduce the level of refund (where goods are 
not rejected initially) to take account of the use of the goods the consumer has had up to that 
point.  For services, Part 1 introduces a new statutory right whereby if a trader provides 
information in relation to a service, and the consumer takes this information into account, the 
service must comply with that information.  There are also new statutory remedies, making it 
clear that consumers can always request these rights and remedies when a trader supplies a 
service to them.  Part 1 further introduces a new category of digital content with tailored 
quality rights and remedies if these are not met. 
 
The influence of EU Directives runs throughout Part 1.  The CSD is implemented in sections 
2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 23, 25, 30, 31, 32 and 59.  In addition, cross-references are made 
to the Consumer Rights Directive (as transposed into the Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013/3134) in sections 11(4)-(6), 12, 
36(3)-(4), 37 and 50(3)-(4)).41  The question remains: does the Act render the law more 
coherent and easier to understand?   For reasons of space, we will address this question in the 
light of the provisions relating to statutory rights and remedies relating to contracts for the 
sale of goods, although it should be remembered that analogous provisions exist for contracts 
for services and the sale of digital content. 
 
(b) Statutory rights under a goods contract. (ss9-18) 
Sections 9 - 11 and 13 - 15 re-transpose Article 2 of the Consumer Sales Directive, regarding 
conformity of goods with the contract. The original transposition was made in the Sale and 
Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 which amended the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.  Not all sections reflect the provisions 
                                                          
41 The Consumer Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2015/1629 Regs 4-6 revoke the provisions of the 2013 
Regulations insofar as they are replicated in the Act.  This does not, as will be seen below, mean that consumers 
will not have to refer to both the Act and the 2013 Regulations in some cases.  Sections 5, 28 and 29 of the CRA 
also replace a small number of provisions dealing with matters related to the delivery of goods and the passing 
of risk which had been earlier placed in the 2013 Regulations: see SI 2015/1629, Reg 8 (which repeals Part 5 of 
the 2013 Regulations). 
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of the CSD, but the aim is to integrate domestic and EU law to give a unified framework of 
statutory rights for consumers.  This is relatively uncontroversial.  The general view has 
always been that the Directive has had little impact on this area of law in that, prior to the 
Directive, UK law had already given substantial effect to the principle of conformity of goods 
with the contract, for example under sections 13-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.42  The 
focus of the Directive on consumers will, however, be accentuated by the implementation of 
these provisions in a consumer rights statute (in contrast to its previous transposition by 
legislation which covered both consumer and commercial contracts).  The very title – the 
Consumer Rights Act – suggests an acknowledgement of the importance of a consumer-
orientated approach and, more fundamentally, explicit recognition that consumers have 
rights. 
 
Yet this attempt at clarity unravels somewhat in relation to sections 11(4), 11(5) and 12(2), 
which contain rather clumsy references to material contained in the Consumer Contracts 
(Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 in an attempt to 
integrate the information requirements within the statutory rights section of the Act.  Any 
information provided by the trader, as required under these Regulations relating to the main 
characteristics of the goods (s.11) or other pre-contract information (s.12), is deemed part of 
the contract.  The information in question is found, however, in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 
or 2 of the 2013 Regulations, not in the Act. If the information regarding the main 
characteristics is not complied with, the consumer can pursue the remedies for breach set out 
in section 19 of the Act.43   
 
This overlap of statutory provisions – due wholly to the fact that the Consumer Rights 
Directive is not implemented by the Consumer Rights Act – lends itself to complexity and 
belies the aim of consolidation.  The reason for implementing the CRD before the CRA was 
due to the Government’s decision to comply with the time limit of 13 June 2014 for the 
                                                          
42 See S Watterson, ‘Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44/EC –The impact on English law’ (2001) 2 & 3 ERPL 
197.  Miller, however, questions whether, despite apparent similarities, common law development of ss.13-15 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 had led to a different interpretation of key concepts such as ‘description’ found in 
s.13 SGA and Art 2(2)(a) of the Directive: L Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law: Exploring 
Europeanisation (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp 98-99.  See also Twigg-Flesner and Bradgate (n 10). 
43 Note that s.19(5) deals separately with section 12, providing that if the trader is in breach of a term that s.12 
requires to be treated as included in the contract, the consumer has the right to recover from the trader the 
amount of any costs incurred by the consumer as a result of the breach, up to the amount of the price paid or the 
value of other consideration given for the goods. 
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application of the CRD in all Member States44 when it became clear that the Consumer 
Rights Bill would not be passed in time to meet this deadline. While laudable, in view of the 
complications which have resulted, it is certainly arguable that missing this deadline might 
have been justifiable if it had led to the consolidation of three major EU Directives in one 
piece of legislation.  It is not as if the UK has never failed to comply with time limits set by 
Directives.  Article 11 of the CSD required Member States to bring into force the laws 
necessary to comply with this Directive not later than 1 January 2002 and yet the UK 
provisions came into force on 31st March 2003.  Alternatively despite earlier implementation, 
the 2012 and 2013 Regulations could have been replaced by the statute, albeit after a very 
short life span which might have been deemed to lead to undesirable uncertainty.  Neither 
option was taken with the result that consumer legislation is spread over a variety of 
regulations and statutes.  This is unfortunate to say the least. 
 
Without engaging in a detailed dissection of the statutory rights in this section, it can be seen 
that this is a technical piece of legislation which is unlikely to be immediately accessible to 
consumers.  The sections are long and detailed.  Consider, for example, section 18 which re-
enacts section 14(1), Sale of Goods Act 1979, providing that unless there is an express term 
concerning the quality of the goods or the goods’ fitness for a particular purpose, or a term 
implied by another enactment, the contract should not be treated as including any such terms, 
other than those set out in sections 9, 10, 13 and (where it applies) 16.  Does such added 
detail give extra clarity or, in the author’s view, render it even more difficult for consumers to 
understand? 
 
(c) Remedies for breach of the statutory rights under a goods contract: ss19-24 
Remedies are a vital component of granting consumers statutory rights.  The Consumer Sales 
Directive seeks to provide a hierarchical order of remedies: defective goods will be repaired 
or replaced or, where this is not appropriate, consumers may obtain a suitable reduction of the 
price or have the contract rescinded.45  Watterson commented that the CSD was likely to have 
its greatest impact in English law in relation to the rights of consumer buyers of non-
                                                          
44 Article 28(2), CRD.  
45 Article 3, CSD.  Article 3(3) provides that ‘In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the 
goods or he may require the seller to replace them, in either case free of charge, unless this is impossible or 
disproportionate.’ See D Staudenmayer, ‘The Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees – a milestone in the European Consumer and Private Law’ (2000) 4 ERPL 547, who notes that 
contrary to the original proposal of the European Commission, the European Parliament and Council had almost 
unanimously opted for a two-stage solution. 
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conforming goods.46  We may note an immediate tension between the hierarchical approach 
of the Directive which assumes that a consumer’s first recourse will be to claim repair or 
replacement of the faulty goods, and the common law preference simply to let the consumer 
reject the goods, terminate the contract and/or pursue an award of damages.47 This tension 
reflects civilian influence in the drafting of the Directive, having as its central remedy a right 
to repair and replacement akin to specific performance.48  Miller argues that ‘the remedy of 
rejection is quite different from that of specific performance (repair and replacement) – the 
latter concerned with continuation of, rather than release from, the contractual obligation and, 
as such, is out of step with common law contract ideology’.49 
 
Despite the framework of the CSD, UK law did not relinquish its adherence to the right to 
reject/damages.  Part 5A of the Sale of Goods Act 197950 merely inserted ‘Additional rights 
of buyer in consumer cases’.  As previously stated, this led to confusion as consumers were 
granted supplementary rights which co-existed uneasily with the remedial philosophy of the 
common law.51  Nevertheless, the Law Commissions argued strongly that the right to reject 
should be retained in the UK as a short-term remedy of first instance, in that it provides a 
simple and easy-to-use remedy which inspires consumer confidence and was strongly 
supported by the consumer groups they had consulted.52   
 
Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, sections 19, 23 and 24 re-transpose Article 3 of the 
CSD.53 On this basis, section 19(3) provides: 
 
If the goods do not conform to the contract because of a breach of any of the terms described in sections 9, 10, 
11, 13 and 14,54 or if they do not conform to the contract under section 16, the consumer’s rights (and the 
provisions about them and when they are available) are— 
                                                          
46 See (n 42), 209. 
47 ‘The buyer’s first and primary remedy for a breach of contract by the seller is to reject the goods, and, if 
appropriate, to repudiate the contract’: C Twigg-Flesner, R Canavan and H Macqueen, Atiyah and Adams’ Sale 
of Goods (13th ed., Harlow: Pearson, 2016) p 435. See also R Halson, Contract Law (2nd ed., Aldershot: Pearson, 
2013) p 433. 
48 Miller (n 11), 92-94. 
49 (n 11), 102. 
50 Cf Part 1B of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. 
51 See M Bridge, ‘A Comment on "Toward a Universal Doctrine of Breach: The Impact of CISG" by Jürgen 
Basedow’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 501. 
52 (n 16), [1.17]-[1.18]. 
53 Note that section 23(3) rectifies s.48B(3)(c) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which arguably incorrectly 
implemented the Directive: see Atiyah and Adams’ Sale of Goods (n 47), 511. 
54 Breach of ss.12 and 15 are dealt with in ss.19(5) and 19(4) respectively. 
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(a) the short-term right to reject (sections 20 and 22); 
(b) the right to repair or replacement (section 23); and 
(c) the right to a price reduction or the final right to reject (sections 20 and 24). 
 
We may note immediately the combination of traditional common law remedies – notably the 
short-term right to reject – with those of the CSD.  Indeed, sections 19(9)-(11) expressly state 
that this Chapter does not prevent the consumer from seeking other remedies including 
damages, specific performance or termination,55 although section 19(10) warns that 
consumers cannot recover twice for the same loss.  On this basis, in some cases the consumer 
may exercise the short-term right to reject and receive a refund, but may also claim damages 
for additional loss caused by the non-conformity of the goods. In other cases, a consumer 
may prefer to claim damages instead of pursuing one of the statutory remedies.56  The result, 
as may be seen, is that while the Act brings together both EU and common law remedies in a 
structured way, the underlying tension between civilian and common law approaches to 
breach remains.  No attempt is made to resolve this issue – the statute merely sidesteps it 
once again by placing the remedies side-by-side.  Under the Act, a consumer may thus reject 
the goods and treat the contract as at an end (ss.20(4)/(5)) or request a repair or replacement 
if available (s.23) (if unavailable, the consumer is left with the options of the short-term right 
to reject or to request a reduction in price or the ‘final’ reject to reject under s.24).  This 
tension is also self-evident from the fact that only sections 19, 23 and 24 implement the CSD, 
which means, in essence, that the other sections do not.   
 
What we do see is section 19 acting as a sign-post, indicating the relevant sections that detail 
these remedies which are now placed in the same section of the Act.  There is also a welcome 
clarification of the (common law) short term right to reject; section 22 setting a minimum 
time period of 30 days in which consumers can reject substandard goods and receive a full 
refund.57  Nevertheless, the fundamental question of the correct remedial approach towards 
defective products remains unresolved.   
                                                          
55 s.19(12) does provide, however, that it is not open to the consumer to treat the contract as at an end for breach 
of a term that this Chapter requires to be treated as included in the contract except as provided by subsections 
(3), (4) and (6).  This overrides any common law right to terminate the contract for breach of the terms which 
these sections require to be treated as included in the contract.   
56 Explanatory Notes to Act, [93]. 
57 The one exception (established under subsection (4)) is that for perishable goods which would not be 
reasonably expected to last longer than 30 days, the period for exercising the short-term right to reject lasts only 
as long as it would be reasonable to expect those goods to last. In 2009 the Law Commission and the Scottish 




It may be argued, of course, that under a minimum harmonisation directive such as the CSD 
this is unnecessary.  While there is truth in this argument, what we see again is a focus on the 
domestic rather than the European.  The CSD provisions are integrated into a national system 
of remedies in which they play only a part.  The resultant legislation is again technical and 
remains complex in nature, reflecting an approach to drafting in which detail is deemed 
beneficial to consumers, but at least a signpost exists.  While here is not the place for a 
detailed dissection of the remedies awarded,58 the measures do highlight the ongoing decision 
of the UK government to continue its policy of granting consumers a free choice of remedies 
as permitted under a minimum harmonisation directive.59  What we see is a consolidation and 
restructuring of domestic consumer law with the minimum necessary adherence to EU 
directives.   
 
Looking at Part 1 of the Act, while  EU law has brought some changes to consumer rights, 
notably in the context of remedies, the introduction of the Consumer Sales Directive has not 
marked, as Dirk Staudenmayer had hoped, ‘an important step towards a future private 
European law’.60   Rather the UK government has concentrated on ensuring that the 
minimum necessary adjustment to national law is achieved.  The measures contained in the 
Consumer Rights Directive are relegated to low profile secondary legislation and we might 
further reflect on the wisdom of not including all the provisions of a maximum harmonisation 
directive focussed on consumer rights in a major UK statute dealing with … consumer rights.  
We might question also to what extent the EU measures, despite the restructuring process, 
continue to act as what Teubner would term ‘legal irritants’,61 fitting uncomfortably with 
existing measures.  Signposting does not signify that the different directions make sense 
collectively.  The fact that the insertion of the CSD into the CRA is described by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
lasted and recommended that, to give certainty, in normal circumstances, a consumer should have 30 days to 
return faulty goods and receive a refund: (n 16).  This is accepted in the CRA 2015, which also accepts the 
Commissions’ recommendation that to prevent consumers from being locked into a cycle of failed repairs, 
consumers should be entitled to escape a contract after one failed repair or one failed replacement: s.24(5)(a). 
58 See, for example, Atiyah and Adams’ Sale of Goods (n 47) pp 506-512; D Barry et al, Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 3.78-3.133. 
59 T Krummel and RM D’Sa, ‘Sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees: A minimalist approach to 
harmonised European Union consumer protection’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 312, 329. 
60 (n 45), 564.  Staudenmayer was, at the time, assistant to the Director-General, Directorate-General Health and 
Consumer Protection.  He is now Head of Unit – Contract Law, DG Justice, European Commission.  See, 
generally, U Magnus, ‘Consumer sales and associated guarantees’ in C Twigg-Flesner (ed), The Cambridge 
Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2010). 
61 G Teubner, ‘Legal irritants: Good faith in British law and how unifying law ends up in new divergences’ 
(1998) 61 MLR 11. 
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Government itself as ‘adequate’62 suggests that this is not an overwhelming endorsement of 
EU consumer policy.  What we see is a consolidation of (some) UK consumer law, taking 
into account EU directives, in a manner that does little to advance the cause for harmonising 
consumer rights and remedies across the EU.   On this basis, it is unlikely that post-Brexit the 
UK government will engage in the time and effort to excise the provisions of the CSD from 
UK law, denying consumers rights and remedies with which they are now familiar.  This 
suggests that Part 1 of the Act is likely to continue in its current form.  The real focus of Part 
1 is the creation of a domestically coherent framework for UK consumer rights.   
 
3. Bringing EU law into the fold III: The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
The influence of EU law seems, however, to be stronger in relation to Part 2 of the Act.  
Here, it can be argued that the decision of the UK to leave the EU may have some impact in 
the future interpretation of the Act.  UK lawyers have long been familiar with the fact that 
‘unfair terms’ have their own regime originating with the transposition of the Unfair Terms 
Directive 93/13/EEC (UTD) into the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1994,63 then 1999 (UTCCR).64  Weatherill has commented that ‘Directive 93/13 is properly 
regarded as the first incursion of EU law into the heartland of national contract law thinking.  
This makes it a challenge for national private lawyers, expected to adapt to EU law method 
after decades of perceiving EU law as, more or less, an enterprise engaged in creating new or 
extended patterns of public law.’65  EU law, he further notes, is not simply setting a common 
rule, it is determining what shall be the content, style and technique of that common rule.66  
The UTCCR, however, were forced to co-exist somewhat uneasily with overlapping 
provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) and, as noted in the introduction, 
commentators were quick to point out the difficulties this raised for consumers trying to 
navigate two distinct pieces of legislation.  The UTCCR also introduced into English law 
concepts such as ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’ which were far from self-
explanatory to a common law audience,67 and reflected civil law influences relating to good 
                                                          
62 Explanatory Notes to Act, [521]. 
63 SI 1994/3159. 
64 SI 1999/ 2083. 
65 S Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (2nd ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) p 145. 
66 Ibid., p 308. 
67 See Reg 5(1) of the 1999 Regulations.  One might consider also the use of the rather clumsy phrase ‘not 
individually negotiated’.  
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faith in contracting.68 By simply copying out the Directive into secondary legislation, the UK 
government made no attempt to bridge this cultural gap or integrate the Directive into 
domestic law – the UTCCR merely stood alongside UCTA 1977.   
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015, Part 2, responds to calls to merge the UTCCR and UCTA 
into one consolidated piece of legislation.  Suggestions that the government would be willing 
to contemplate such a step may be traced back to January 2001 when the Law Commission 
and the Scottish Law Commission first received from the Parliamentary Under Secretary of 
State for Consumers and Corporate Affairs a request to consider the desirability and 
feasibility of replacing UCTA 1977 and the UTCCR 1999 with a unified regime.  In their 
report of 2005, the Commissions found that the co-existence of two overlapping schemes 
gave rise to complexity and inconsistency and should be replaced by a unified regime for 
consumers with improved protection for small businesses.69  When asked by the Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) in May 2012 to review and update the 2005 
recommendations in relation to B2C contracts, the Commissions re-iterated their view that 
UCTA 1977 and the 1999 Regulations should be consolidated.70 
 
On this basis, the Act revokes the UTCCR 199971 and amends UCTA 1977 to remove B2C 
contracts from its scope.72   UCTA 1977 will continue to apply to B2B and C2C contracts.  In 
this section, we will examine the nature of the merger between domestic legislation and the 
provisions of the EU Directive, noting, in particular, the extent to which the (minimum 
harmonisation) provisions of the Directive have influenced the shape of the resultant 
legislation.  In this area of law at least, could it be said that UK law does reflect EU consumer 
norms? 
 
(a) The aim of Part 2 of the Act 
                                                          
68 See H. Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 229. For a study of the differences in 
relation to good faith in contracting across the European Union, see R Zimmermann and S Whittaker (eds), 
Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge: CUP 2000). 
69 Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292) (Scot Law Com No 199) (Cm 6464, 2005). 
70 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A new approach? 
Issues Paper (2012).   
71 Schedule 4, para 34, Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
72 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 also covers notices to the extent that they relate to rights or obligations 
between traders and consumers or purports to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer: s.61(4).  It 
does not cover contracts of employment or apprenticeship: s.61(2). 
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The aim of Part 2 of the Act is straightforward: to consolidate in one place the legislation 
governing unfair contract terms in relation to consumer contracts, which was previously 
found in two separate pieces of legislation, removing anomalies and overlapping provisions.  
Sections 62- 69 establish the general rules about fairness.  Section 64, in particular, seeks to 
make it clearer when the price or subject matter of the contract cannot be considered for 
fairness, introducing the new condition of prominence in addition to that of transparency.  
Section 63 and Schedule 2 also clarify the role of, and extend the indicative list of, terms 
which may be regarded as unfair (the so-called ‘grey list’). 
 
The influence of the UTD runs throughout Part 2.  The Directive is implemented in sections 
61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76 and Schedules 2, 3 and 5.73  It is hard, therefore, 
to deny the prominence of the Directive in shaping these new provisions of UK law.  In this 
section, we will focus on four key statutory provisions which have been chosen for the insight 
they provide into the extent to which EU law has influenced Part 2 of the Act.  We will also 
consider the influence of recent case-law of the CJEU on the 1993 Directive.74  In examining, 
in turn, section 62 (requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair), section 61 
(contracts and notices covered by Part 2), section 71 (duty of the court to consider fairness of 
term) and section 64 (exclusion from assessment of fairness), a number of trends may be 
identified.  It is clear, in particular, that a considerable effort has been made to ensure that 
these provisions are consistent with EU law.  Nevertheless, an ongoing focus on domestic 
concerns may also be identified, arguably to the detriment of ensuring a common European 
approach to unfair terms.  These provisions will be examined below. 
 
(b) Four key sections: ss 62, 61, 71 and 64 
(i) Section 62 (Requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair) 
Section 62(4) implements Art. 3.1 of the Directive which requires that ‘A contractual term ... 
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
the consumer.’  By copying its wording, there is no question of incorrect transposition.75  A 
                                                          
73 See also s.2 (key definitions). 
74 See N Gavrilovic, ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Directive through the practice of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Interpretation or something more?’ (2013) 9 ERCL 163. 
75 s.62(4): ‘A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.’ This was also the policy of 
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corresponding test for unfair notices exists:76 the Act, by covering both contract terms and 
notices in order to absorb the consumer provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
has impact, therefore, on both the law of contract and tort.  An unfair term or consumer notice 
will not be binding on the consumer, although this does not prevent the consumer from 
relying on the term or notice if the consumer chooses to do so.77  Whether a term is fair will 
be determined by taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and by 
reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other 
terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends.78 
 
We therefore see a test based on that of the 1993 Directive.  Although it covers contracts and 
notices previously governed by UCTA 1977, the language is that of the Directive.  This 
potentially gives rise, however, to difficulties arising from the distinct terminology used in 
the Directive, as discussed above.  If a common law court is likely to find ‘good faith’ and 
‘significant imbalance’ difficult to interpret, is the Act recreating these difficulties?  The Law 
Commissions in 2005 argued that the UTD should be rewritten in a clear way, using 
terminology familiar to a UK audience.  The draft Bill which accompanied the Report 
suggested a number of changes to the Directive’s wording which would make it easier to 
understand. As late as 2012 in their Issues Paper,79 the Commissions favoured a test which 
focused not on good faith, but on whether the term was ‘fair and reasonable’, fearing that a 
reference to ‘good faith’ might be confusing to a UK audience.  Their opinion changed, 
however, in 2013 when the Commissions announced that:  
 
‘We have been persuaded by the strong arguments put to us that the words of the UTD should be changed only 
if there is a good reason to do so. We therefore recommend that the fairness test set out in articles 3(1) and 4(1) 
of the UTD should be replicated in the new legislation.’80 
 
This change is attributed to the fact that the test is now more familiar to a UK audience, and 
has acquired a significant body of domestic and European case law to help interpret it.  The 
Commissions therefore concluded that: ‘It no longer appears to give rise to much confusion. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the UTCCR, see Reg 5(1), 1999 Regulations.  However, s.62(4), unlike Art. 3.1 UTD, makes no reference to 
‘non individually negotiated’ terms – this will be dealt with below. 
76 ss.62(6) and (7).  
77 ss.62(1)-(3), implementing Art 6.1 of the Directive. 
78 ss.62(5), implementing Art. 4.1 of the Directive. 
79 (n 70) [9.50]. 
80 English and Scottish Law Commissions, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (March 2013), s.32.  
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We have been persuaded that the benefits of changing the formulation do not outweigh the 
risks of introducing new uncertainties.’81   
 
What conclusions may be drawn from this change of heart?  Those favouring 
Europeanisation might argue that the legal transplant has finally worked and that UK lawyers 
have come to accept good faith as an appropriate standard of behaviour, but it should be 
noted that the Commissions’ Advice does not go this far.  Their reasons are primarily 
pragmatic.  The decision to copy out the wording of the Directive in the 1994 and 1999 
UTCCR led to UK lawyers being forced to utilise this new terminology, with the assistance 
of guidance from the CJEU and Office of Fair Trading.  Having gone to the effort to master 
these new provisions, many consultees were perhaps understandably reluctant to start again 
with yet another statutory test.  The choice is, therefore, predicated on the need to avoid the 
uncertainty likely to ensue if a new statutory test were introduced, supplemented by concern 
of a potential clash with the CJEU.  ‘Better the devil you know’ is hardly the strongest reason 
to adopt a test based on a European Directive, but nevertheless the wording of Article 3.1 of 
the UTD is placed at the heart of Part 2 of the CRA.   
 
It remains to be seen whether the Commissions’ confidence is justified.  The Supreme Court 
in November 2015 described the Article 3.1 test as ‘rather opaque’ which suggests that some 
uncertainty does still exist.82  It should also be borne in mind that UCTA 1977 will continue 
to rule on what is ‘fair and reasonable’ albeit not in relation to B2C contracts.  The guidance 
on the fairness test provided by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)83 in July 
2015 is 10 pages long and covers not only UK case-law, such as Director-General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc,84  but also acknowledges the role to be played by the 
CJEU in providing guidance on the meaning of ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’.85  
This is significant.  It is a well-established principle of EU law that certain words or phrases 
in a directive may have their own autonomous and uniform meaning. Member States are 
                                                          
81 Ibid., [6.42]. 
82 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 W.L.R. 
1373, [105] per Lords Neuberger and Sumption (Lord Carnwath agreeing). 
83 CMA, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance CMA 37 (2015). 
84 [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481.   
85 Reference is made to Case C-415/11 Aziz v Caixa D’Estalvis de Catalunya [2013] All ER (EC) 770, [44]-[45] 
and [68]-[69] (Spanish procedural rules which prevented borrowers in arrears from effectively contesting the 
fairness of their mortgage agreements were contrary to EU law).  The Supreme Court recently described Aziz as 
‘the leading case on the topic’: Cavendish Square Holding (n 82), [105]. Lord Toulson, however, in this case 
disputed the majority’s interpretation of Aziz which he found to water down the test adopted by the CJEU: [315].  
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expected to adopt this meaning, taking into account the context of that provision and the 
purpose of the legislation in question.86  CJEU case-law indicates that its jurisdiction does 
extend to the interpretation of ‘unfair terms’ and, as such, its guidance should be taken into 
account by national courts.  In Penzugyi v Schneider (C-137/08),87 for example, the Grand 
Chamber of the CJEU ruled that although it was for the national court to determine whether a 
particular contractual term actually satisfied the fairness test, the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
extended to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair term’ and to the criteria which the 
national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of the 
provisions of the Directive. 
 
In choosing to copy out the Directive, the Act gives European terminology greater 
prominence in this area of law, but this does signify that the determination of the content of 
the ‘fairness’ test requires consideration of both national and EU case-law, albeit applied to 
the particular facts of each case.  This was accepted by the CMA and is a logical consequence 
of the wording of section 62.  Brexit, however, does render this more contentious.  While the 
UK remains in the EU, the decisions of the CJEU remain binding, including those 
interpreting the UTD.  Post-Brexit, this will no longer be the case.  Will such decisions 
become, however, persuasive authority (similar to that of the Privy Council?)88 in interpreting 
section 62 or will the UK courts seek to develop its own autonomous common law 
interpretation of the test?   Much, as with Brexit itself, remains unclear.   
 
(ii) Section 61 (Contracts and notices covered by Part 2) 
Section 61(1) simply states that: ‘This Part applies to a contract between a trader and a 
consumer’.  No provision is made that the term in question be ‘not individually negotiated’ as 
previously required by the 1994 and 1999 UTCCR and stated in Article 3.1 of the Directive.  
On this basis, the CRA provides that a term can be deemed to be unfair even if it has been 
individually negotiated with the consumer.   The UTD as a minimum harmonisation directive 
permits such divergence which goes beyond the protection required by the Directive, but it is 
                                                          
86 This does not apply, however, if the Directive expressly refers to the law of the Member States. See Case 
C-279/12 Fish Legal and Shirley [2014] QB 521, [42]; Case C-204/09 Flachglas Torgau [2013] QB 212, [37].  
This is necessary to ensure the uniform application of EU law across Member States and to comply with the 
principle of equality 
87 Case 137/08 VB Penzugyi Lizing Zrt v Ferenc Schneider [2011] 2 CMLR 1, [44] (exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction clause).  See also C-26/13 Kásler v OTP Jelzalogbank Zrt  [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 443. 
88 Consider, however, Willers v Gubay [2016] UKSC 44, [2016] 3 W.L.R. 534. 
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an interesting question as to why the Government has chosen this path.  In their 2012 Issue 
Paper, the Law Commissions argued that the distinction between negotiated and non-
negotiated terms raised complexity and stated their belief that the legislation would be 
simpler if the exclusion of negotiated terms were removed.  The key issue here, of course, is 
that in merging UCTA and the UTCCR, the former did cover negotiated consumer contracts 
and to confine the Act to standard terms would reduce the protection previously granted by 
UCTA.  In its 2013 Advice, the Commissions went further and argued that ‘the current 
exemption for negotiated terms in the UTCCR encourages unnecessary argument and 
litigation. The legislation will be simpler and more easily enforced if the distinction between 
standard terms and negotiated terms is removed.’89   
 
This represents a positive step for consumers, focussing on the potential for exploitation 
rather than form.  It is, however, unlikely to make real difference in practice given that very 
few consumer contracts can, in reality, be said to be individually negotiated – a factor which 
influenced the Law Commissions90 and no doubt the Government.   In going beyond the 
Directive, therefore, we see a pragmatic approach which responds to the challenges of 
consolidating domestic and EU legislation. Extending the provisions of the Directive to all 
contract terms will benefit the consumer, but highlights the fact that even pre-Brexit 
divergence existed in relation to the transposition of the Directive in EU Member States.91  
 
(iii) Section 71(2) (Duty  of court to consider fairness of term) 
The CRA, section 71(2) provides that the court must consider whether the term is fair even if 
none of the parties to the proceedings has raised that issue or indicated that it intends to raise 
it.  This obligation is new and is found not in the 1993 Directive, but in the case-law of the 
CJEU.  On this basis, section 71 is introduced to comply with EU law, notably the ruling of 
the CJEU in Mostaza Claro that ‘the nature and importance of the public interest underlying 
the protection which the Directive confers on consumers justify, moreover, the national court 
being required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term is unfair, compensating 
in this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier.’92 
                                                          
89 Law Commission Advice (2013) (n 80), s.40. 
90 (n 70), at [9.31-9.35], finding that the reform would affect very few cases in that it is rare for a consumer to 
negotiate about any term except the price or main subject matter. 
91 It should be noted, however, that not all Member States have implemented the requirement for ‘non 
individually negotiated’ terms e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, France, Finland and Sweden. 
92 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Movil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421, [38]. 
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This obligation is justified on the grounds that the system of protection introduced by the 
Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or 
supplier, as regards both her bargaining power and her level of knowledge, and, therefore, to 
guarantee the protection intended by the Directive, such imbalance of power may only be 
corrected by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract.93  It is 
necessary, therefore, to ensure that the consumer enjoys effective protection, in view of the 
real risk that she is unaware of her rights or encounters difficulties in enforcing them.94  
Where the court considers such a term to be unfair it must not apply it, unless the consumer 
opposes that non-application.95 
 
Prior to the Act, despite a clear line of authority at CJEU level and criticism from a number 
of commentators,96  there was little evidence that the English courts had appreciated the 
impact of CJEU case-law.  Micklitz and Reich argue that this was problematic:  
 
‘... the insistence of the ECJ on this ex officio obligation has put Member State law on trial and seems to 
contradict the well-established principle of “procedural autonomy”.  But this “procedural autonomy” ... is not 
without limits and has to be balanced with the principle of “effectiveness”, which has a long tradition in EU 
law.’97 
 
The Law Commissions in their Issues Paper acknowledged that this is an area where the 
CJEU had provided a definitive ruling, namely that a national court is obliged to raise the 
unfairness of a term of its own motion whether or not a consumer has raised the issue.98 
 
The Government, therefore, had little option but to acknowledge this procedural change in 
drafting the legislation, but it is not without a caveat.  S.71(3) states that s.71(2) does not 
apply unless the court considers that it has before it sufficient legal and factual material to 
                                                          
93 Penzugyi (n 87), [46]-[48]; Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Quintero [2000] 
ECR I-4941, [25]-[27].  
94 Case C-473/00 Cofidis v Fredout [2002] ECR I-10875 at [33]; Océano Grupo (n 93), [26]. 
95 Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-04713, [35]. 
96 See, for example, S Whittaker, ‘Judicial intervention and consumer contracts’ (2001) 117 LQR 215 and V 
Trstenjak and E Beysen, ‘European consumer protection law: Curia semper dabit remedium?’ (2011) 48 CML 
Rev 95, 121, who argue that case-law had implicitly raised the effectiveness threshold which national procedural 
rules for the enforcement of EU rights must meet.  
97 H-W Micklitz and N Reich, ‘The court and Sleeping Beauty: the revival of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 771, 802.  See also V Trstenjak, ‘Procedural aspects of European consumer 
protection law and the case law of the CJEU’ (2013) 21 ERPL 451. 
98 (n 70), [7.7]. 
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enable it to consider the fairness of the term.  This reflects the view of the CJEU in Pannon.99   
The Explanatory Notes to the Act also recognise that the courts would only have to look at 
the term or terms in question, not the entire contract.100 
 
This change will lead to contract terms coming under increasing scrutiny by the courts.  A 
term may be held to be unfair even when the consumer has not complained of unfairness.  We 
may speculate, however, how often this will occur.  At a basic level, who will raise the 
court’s duty to consider the fairness of a particular term where neither litigating party has 
appreciated that this is an issue in the first place?  Further, the common law has generally 
adopted a model of civil procedure based on the notion of the parties themselves presenting 
legal arguments in their favour to a neutral judge.  In spite of the changes to civil procedure 
introduced under the Woolf reforms,101 it remains the case that the idea of a judge raising 
points of law of his or her motion bears a closer resemblance to the civilian ‘managerial’ 
judge who is responsible for fact-finding and establishing the truth than that of the traditional 
common law judge.102  We might also question to what extent section 71(3) will provide a 
fall-back for courts when a failure to comply with this duty is raised at a later stage of 
proceedings.  Commentators have speculated that the court will be expected to refer to the 
case file, but it is unclear to what extent it should extend beyond that.103   
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of section 71 is significant in that it marks a rare occasion 
where a new procedural rule has been introduced into UK private law as a result of judicial 
activity by the CJEU.  As such, its future remains uncertain post-Brexit.  Will it be excised as 
indicative of a civilian approach to civil procedure or survive as a measure helping UK 
consumers and overcoming their ignorance of UK consumer law?  Or will simply lethargy 
allow it to survive as a legacy of the UK’s membership of the EU?  Only time will tell. 
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(iv) Section  64 (Exclusion from assessment of fairness)   
The UTD does controversially make limited provision for certain core terms to be excluded 
from the fairness test, although there is clear authority that any exception to the rules which 
seek to come to the aid of consumers who are weak vis-à-vis sellers or suppliers, both in 
bargaining power and level of knowledge, should be interpreted narrowly.104 Added late in 
the legislative process,105 Article 4.2 of the UTD provides that: 
 
‘Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of 
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods 
supplied in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language.’ 
 
This seeks to ensure the inviolability of the core bargain: provided the terms expressing it are 
plain and intelligible, then this should remain an area controlled by the parties, not the courts.  
On this basis, as the CJEU stated in Caja de Madrid, ‘the terms referred to in Article 4(2), 
while they come within the area covered by the Directive, escape the assessment as to 
whether they are unfair only in so far as the national court having jurisdiction should form the 
view, following a case-by-case examination, that they were drafted by the seller or supplier in 
plain, intelligible language.’106 The key question therefore is the scope of these terms which 
relate to the ‘definition of the main subject matter of the contract’ and ‘the adequacy of the 
price and remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in exchange’.107  As is well 
known, the UK courts have struggled to determine the breadth of these exceptions, most 
notably in the litigation over bank charges, which culminated in the 2009 Supreme Court 
decision: Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc.108  This was a test case in which the 
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OFT challenged whether charges for unauthorised overdrafts fell within the Article 4.2 
exemption.  Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court found in 
favour of the banks.  The bank charges, in its view, constituted part of the price or 
remuneration for the bank services provided and there was no reason to read into the 
provisions a distinction between the main and incidental price. On this basis, provided they 
were in plain and intelligible language, the banks’ overdraft charges could not be assessed for 
fairness.  
 
The decision of a UK court to adopt a broad interpretation of Article 4.2 was controversial, 
not least in view of the fact that the Supreme Court disagreed with the decisions of the Court 
of Appeal and High Court and yet refused to refer the question to the CJEU under the Article 
267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure, noting that there was a strong public interest in 
resolving the matter without further delay.109  The Law Commissions in their Issues Paper of 
2012 highlighted the uncertainty which followed this decision for both consumers and traders 
and recommended changes to the existing regime.110  They also noted the possibility, flagged 
by academics,111 that the decision might find itself in conflict with the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU.  They suggested, therefore, that to ensure the UK’s implementation of Article 4.2 was 
certain enough to withstand any decisions of the CJEU, a ‘slightly higher’ level of consumer 
protection was needed which would narrow the scope of the exemption.112 Following their 
recommendation, section 64 of the CRA provides that: 
 
(1) A term of a consumer contract113 may not be assessed for fairness under section 62 to the extent that— 
(a) it specifies the main subject matter of the contract,114 or 
(b) the assessment is of the appropriateness115 of the price payable under the contract by comparison with the 
goods, digital content or services supplied under it.  
(2) Subsection (1) excludes a term from an assessment under section 62 only if it is transparent and prominent. 
                                                          
109 Ibid., [50] per Lord Walker. For criticism, see M Schillig, ‘Directive 93/13 and the “price term exemption”: 
A comparative analysis in the light of the “market for lemons” rationale’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 933, who notes, 
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appropriateness or reasonableness (in amount).’ 
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(3) A term is transparent for the purposes of this Part if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and (in 
the case of a written term) is legible. 
(4) A term is prominent for the purposes of this section if it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way 
that an average consumer would be aware of the term. 
(5) In subsection (4) “average consumer” means a consumer who is reasonably well-informed, observant and 
circumspect. 
(6) This section does not apply to a term of a contract listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (grey list). 
 
The key feature is the addition of the ‘prominence’ requirement to the pre-existing 
requirement of transparency (or ‘plain and intelligible language’ in the Directive).   This was 
recommended by the Law Commissions and signifies that the wording of the term is brought 
to the consumer's attention in such a way that the ‘average consumer’ – who is reasonably 
well informed, observant and circumspect - would be aware of it.   The exemptions are also 
redefined to render them clearer.  One notable development is the clarification that the price 
exemption is confined to ‘the appropriateness’ of the price and will not extend to other price-
related issues such as price variation clauses (which are included, in any event, in the grey list 
found in Part 1, Schedule 2).116  The Explanatory Notes give the example of an individual 
who contracts with a catering company to provide a buffet lunch, and the contract includes a 
term that the individual will pay £100 for a three course meal.  Here, the court cannot look at 
whether it is fair to pay £100 for three courses, but it may look at other things, such as the 
rights of the company and the individual to cancel the lunch, and when the price is due to be 
paid.117 
 
The aim is greater clarity, but a number of questions remain.  The most obvious issue is what 
the prominence test adds to the test of ‘plain and intelligible language’.   The Explanatory 
Notes to the Act give the example of a term in the small print.118  Prominence, it is submitted, 
will require the trader to make efforts to ensure that the reasonable consumer would notice 
the terms in question.  In their 2012 Issues Paper, the Law Commissions speculate that the 
more unusual or onerous the term, the more prominent it needs to be.119  This is indeed in line 
with common law authority such as Interfoto v Stiletto120 but does give the courts 
considerable discretion on the facts of each particular case.  It remains to be seen just how 
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117 Explanatory Notes to Act, [317]. 
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demanding a test of ‘prominence’ will be in practice.  It is clear that the underlying 
justification is that of presenting traders with a choice – either to fail the test of transparency 
and prominence and run the risk of a finding of unfairness, or to present the terms in a way 
that the average consumer would be aware of their existence. 
 
The ‘average consumer’ in sections 64(4) and (5) is a key component of the prominence 
requirement and here the Act relies upon a concept found in European private law.  There is 
no explicit reference to this concept in the UTD, but it has arisen in other contexts and sets an 
objective standard of the reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect 
consumer.121  It is not without criticism, however, both from EU122  and common lawyers.123  
Hondius, for example, juxtaposes the ‘weak’ consumer who is hardly able to read a contract 
and in need of information about every conceivable item, with the ‘EU’ consumer who is the 
well-advised citizen who wishes to make full use of the internal market.124 In choosing to 
adopt this standard based on EU internal market policy, the Act thus introduces a European 
concept, albeit one which does not seem out of kilter with current UK law.125  It should not be 
assumed, however, that the idea of the EU consumer is either used consistently across EU 
law,126 or is static.  Recent case-law suggests that the objective consumer must not only be 
presented with a term which is grammatically intelligible, but also that the consumer should 
be in a position to evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic 
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consequences for her which derive from the term, given the level of attention to be expected 
of the average consumer.127  Is this a more onerous test than that stated in section 64?  The 
problem with importing a European standard is that its meaning will evolve according to 
decisions of the CJEU, Brexit or no Brexit.  This signifies that decisions of the CJEU on the 
‘average consumer’ will remain relevant, even if no longer binding on the UK courts post-
Brexit, and places an onus on national courts to monitor the evolution of this concept beyond 
the 2015 Act.   
 
There remains also the issue of the scope of the exemptions themselves: a term specifying the 
main subject matter of the contract, or raising the issue of the appropriateness of the price 
payable under the contract.  In relation to the main subject matter of the contract, there is 
clear European authority that the exemption should be limited to terms which describe the 
essential obligations of contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.128 
The CJEU in Kásler129  provides useful guidance.  The case concerned a dispute relating to 
the terms of a mortgage, whereby the outstanding amount was calculated according to the 
buying rate of Swiss Francs (on the day when the contract was concluded), but the 
instalments were based on the currency's selling rate, which is usually higher.   The CJEU 
drew a clear distinction between terms which ‘lay down the essential obligations of the 
contract and, as such, characterise it’ and ‘terms ancillary to those that define the very 
essence of the contractual relationship’.130 The latter cannot fall within the notion of the 
‘main subject-matter of the contract’ within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Directive.  
Such a distinction should logically be read into section 64(1)(a).   
 
Section 64(1)(b), in contrast, does not introduce any division between main and ancillary 
price terms; rather the issue is the nature of the term – does the complaint relate to the 
appropriateness of the price in question or other concerns?  Again Kásler is helpful here in 
highlighting that the exclusion is limited to the adequacy of the price and cannot apply where 
there is a challenge (as in this case) to terms which merely determine the conversion rate of 
the foreign currency to which the loan agreement is denominated.131 
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The interface between EU and UK law is of particular interest in this context.  In favouring a 
test of the ‘average consumer’ and framing the base level of consumer protection on concepts 
such as transparency and prominence, the Act is supporting a market-led approach which 
expects consumers to be self-reliant and protect their own interests.132  The goal is to prevent 
consumers from being unfairly surprised by contract terms of whose existence they could not 
reasonably be expected to be aware.  This will, it is assumed, encourage consumers to be 
more confident in making transactions, increase consumer choice and thereby raise the level 
of consumer protection.  This is indeed consistent with one of the goals of the Directive in 
removing market disparities and distortions in competition,133  together with its constitutional 
base of Art 114 TFEU, which is a measure ‘for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.’  Further, the Commission’s 2012 
Consumer Agenda was stated to be one of promoting measures which empower consumers, 
enabling them actively to participate in the market.134  While this has not prevented 
academics such as Willett from asserting that it is still possible to develop the ‘average 
consumer’ concept in relatively protective ways, he concedes that this would require 
regulators and national governments to play a key role in maximising this level of 
protection.135  This is not, however, the intention of section 64.  In framing the exemptions 
within a framework in which both traders and consumers make informed choices, the 
intention of the Government is clear - the trader’s duty is solely to ensure that terms covered 
in section 64(1) are clearly brought to the consumer’s attention.   Section 64, it is anticipated, 
will remove the uncertainty created by the Abbey National decision and avoid any clash with 
the CJEU.  The aim of this section is therefore not to overturn the Abbey National case, but 
render its application as a precedent more straight-forward, responding to the concern of the 
Law Commissions that the case might give traders a false sense of security, whilst 
discouraging consumers from challenging similar terms.  Section 64 seeks, therefore, to 
restate the Article 4.2 exemption in more ‘user friendly’ language, making clear that other 
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aspects of the price other than the amount e.g. timing of payment can be assessed for fairness.  
It will remain the case, however, that if the traders are vigilant in satisfying the tests of 
transparency and prominence, there is no reason why the core exemptions should not 
continue to operate successfully in UK law.  
 
Conclusion 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 is an important piece of legislation, both for consumers and 
contract lawyers generally.  It seeks to simplify, strengthen and modernise UK consumer law 
and to resolve inconsistencies and overlaps caused by the implementation of EU legislation in 
domestic law.  The decision to absorb and consolidate a number of EU directives must, 
however, now be considered in the light of the decision in the June 2016 referendum that the 
UK should withdraw from the EU.  Embedding EU consumer law in a landmark piece of 
national legislation marks the successful transplantation of EU law into the heart of the 
common law system of law.  In consolidating domestic law with selected EU directives, 
Parliament has engaged in a process which Gerstenberg recently described as ‘an alignment 
of national law with the EU’s shared fundamental values and principles.’136  This, he argues, 
requires a non-hierarchical, participatory dialogue between national and European Courts.   It 
is not therefore simply a matter of tidying up inconsistent pieces of legislation, but involves 
the introduction of distinct forms of reasoning and conceptual frameworks into UK law.137   
 
Yet this article has argued that the impact of EU law on the provisions of the Act should not 
be exaggerated.  The Act does not implement the Consumer Rights Directive and Part 1 – 
which transposes the 1999 Consumer Sales Directive (CSD) – absorbs the CSD into a wider 
framework of (common law) statutory rights and remedies.  This diminishes not only the 
visibility of these instruments, but also their impact.   No attempt has been made to tackle the 
conceptual divide between the common law and civil law idea of remedies.  This ideological 
gulf is papered over, with a sign-post erected to point the consumer to a free choice of 
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remedies.  This reflects the dominant concerns of UK lawyers, as identified by the Law 
Commissions in their 2009 Report.138   
 
Part 2, in contrast, does reflect to a much greater degree the influence of EU law.  It is clear 
that sections 62, 64 and 71 were introduced not only to resolve uncertainty in the law, but to 
avoid a potential clash with the CJEU made apparent in the reports of the Law Commissions 
and in the reaction to the Abbey National decision.  Indeed, the adoption of the Article 3.1 
UTD test for unfairness for all consumer contracts, be they standard term or not, appears to 
be a strong step towards a common European standard of protection across Member States.  
Regardless of the reasons for this step, which it has been suggested may be based more on 
convenience than ideology, UK law has accepted a test previously described as a ‘legal 
irritant’ by one learned writer.139 Equally, section 71 indicates recognition by the UK 
government that decisions at CJEU level have led to procedural changes in UK private law.  
Section 64 seeks to solve the ‘Abbey National problem’ by bringing UK law more in line 
with decisions of the CJEU, albeit by adopting a market–led approach based on the 
reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect consumer.  What this means in practice 
is that, pre-Brexit, UK courts must ensure that they follow the interpretative guidance of the 
CJEU when deciding matters relating to transposed EU law.  Post-Brexit, this indicates that 
certain key decisions will need to be made.  First, it must be resolved which, if any, of the 
EU-sourced provisions of the Act should be repealed.  In view of the long-standing influence 
of the provisions of the 1993 Unfair Terms Directive and 1999 Consumer Sales Directive on 
UK law and the destabilising effect of change, it seems very unlikely that any government 
will engage in the effort needed to amend an Act which only came into force in October 
2015.  A more pertinent question, therefore, is how the courts will interpret such provisions 
post-Brexit.  I have suggested that the decisions of the CJEU should continue to be 
considered as persuasive authority, although this may weaken over time if the text of the 
directives change.  The 1993 and 1999 Directives, for example, are currently subject to the 
Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) which is currently 
evaluating if they remain fit for purpose.  The 2011 Directive is also subject to review.  EU 
consumer law is also far from static.  It is often unsettled and subject to change both in terms 
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of new judgments of the CJEU, but also alterations of policy and fresh initiatives at the 
Commission level.140  The European Commission is, for example, currently putting forward 
two proposals for new consumer directives on contracts for the supply of digital content141 
and contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods.142  There is a chance, therefore, 
that the Consumer Rights Act 2015 will embody a version of the directives which gradually 
becomes dated over time, rendering EU law of diminishing relevance.  
 
Where, therefore, does this leave the aim of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to remove 
obvious signs of tension between EU and UK consumer legislation?  The Act is an ambitious 
and landmark piece of legislation.  Nevertheless, problems of interpretation remain, not least 
for the poor consumer who faces a complex piece of legislation which does not even 
consolidate all UK consumer rights legislation.  This article has argued that the tensions 
between EU and UK consumer legislation have not been fully resolved, but that certain 
policy decisions have been made, some of which make express reference to EU law and 
principles.  Pre-Brexit, this means that the courts need to appreciate that in applying this new 
domestic statute, they will have to refer to CJEU case-law and monitor future developments, 
notably in the area of unfair terms.    Should the CJEU, for example, continue in its more 
dynamic approach to the Unfair Terms Directive,143 this will be relevant to the application of 
Part 2 of the Act.  Post-Brexit, the courts will need to resolve how to interpret provisions 
introduced into UK law by EU directives.  It is submitted that EU law should continue to 
have some influence on the development of UK consumer law in the same way that the donor 
system of a legal transplant might prove a reference point for its future interpretation.144    
This may prove to be controversial but, in reflecting changes made to UK consumer law by 
EU directives for over 20 years, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 highlights the difficulty, 
perhaps impossibility, of reverting back to a purely common law form of consumer law.  
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